THE

FINAL

DETERMINATION

CLAUSE:

DEFENSE TO EMPLOYEE SECTION 301(a)
SUITS
In LMRA section 301(a) suits by individual employees, the
courts have primarilyfocused upon the presence or absence of
contractual arbitration clauses in deciding whether or not to
dispose of these actions on a motion for summary judgment.
Frequently, however, labor contracts also include final
determination clauses, the intended effect of which is to restrict
the employee to the grievance procedure exclusively for
resolution of his complaint. By analyzing open-end grievance
procedures, which have no provision for arbitrationbut which
often containfinal determination clauses, this comment seeks to
determine ultimate legal consequences of such clauses and to
ascertain whether or not the results are consistent with federal
laborpolicy.

A

PROMINENT federal labor policy, enunciated both in statute
and in Supreme Court decisions, encourages the private
settlement of employee grievances through methods prescribed by
the collective bargaining agreement.' This policy strengthens the
representative role of labor organizations by requiring aggrieved
employees to seek vindication of their contract rights through the
union-controlled grievance machinery.' The unions' exclusive power
over employee grievances was, however, at least partially
undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Evening
'See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964); Hays, The
Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1036 (1965).
' Where the union and the employer so provide in the collective bargaining agreement, an
individual employee unquestionably has a right to have his grievance processed through the
grievance machinery. See. e.g. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). The
National Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964), provides that "any individual employee or
group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
and to have such grievances adjusted, without intervention of the bargaining representative,
as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect; Provided further. That the Bargaining representative
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News Association3 which allowed individual employees' claims to
be brought under section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act.4 The effect of Evening News on private settlement

procedures was initially speculative because the majority opinion,
as Mr. Justice Black's dissent noted, "refrained from saying when,

for what kinds of breach or under what circumstances an individual
employee can bring a section 301 action . . . ."I Subsequently, the
courts have steadily cut down the practical efficacy of employee

private suits under section 301(a), especially in cases where the
collective bargaining agreement has a clause that purports to make

the employer-union resolution of grievances "final and binding" on
all parties.6
In considering whether such a final determination clause can or

should affect an employee's right to sue under section 301(a), this
comment surveys the major Supreme Court interpretations of
section 301(a) and analyzes those lower court decisions which have
treated the issue. This inquiry will be made in the context of two

kinds of grievance procedures: one which provides for impartial
arbitration as the final step, and the other, known as an open-end
procedure, 7 having no arbitration clause. Consideration will also be

given to the effect of an allegation of unfair representation upon the
decisiveness of a final determination clause.
has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment." This proviso has been
interpreted as granting individual employees the right to process their own grievances. See.
e.g., West Tex. Util. Co. v. NLRB. 206 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 346 U.S. 855
(1953). Nevertheless, other courts have held that the proviso merely gives the employer the
freedom to consider grievances presented by an individual employee without conferring upon
the employee a substantive right to compel the employer to process his grievance. E.g.. BlackClawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 1-.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1961). See
generalflr Wyle, Labor Arbitration and Mhe Concept oJ xL.cclusive Repre.seniation. 7 BC. IND.
& Co.%i. L. REV. 783 (1966).
'371 U.S. 195 (1962). See notes 23 & 24 injra and accompanying text.
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
Section 301(a) is entitled "'Suits by and against Labor Organizations." for a quotation of
the language of § 301(a) of the LMRA, see text accompanying note 18 injra.
*371 U.S. at 204; see Aughenbaugh v. North Am. Refractories Co.. 426 Pa. 364.
231 A.2d 173 (1967).
'See. e.g.. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Haynes v. United States Pipe &
I-oundry Co.. 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966); Hildreth v. Union News Co., 315 1-.2d 548 (6th
Cir.), ceri. denied. 375 U.S. 826 (1963).
See. e.g. Haynes v United States Pipe & I-oundry (o.. 362 I".2d 414 (5th (.ir.
1966):
'International Bhd. of Tel. Workers v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 240 F. Supp. 426 (D.
Mass. 1965): Alarcon v. Fabricon Prods., 5 Mich. App. 25, 145 N.W.2d 816 (1966).
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GRIEVANCE MACHINERY

As a means of settling employee grievances expeditiously and of
discouraging specious claims, employers and unions frequently
incorporate grievance procedures into their collective bargaining
agreements. Under the terms of these agreements, when a
complaint arises the individual employee must first attempt to
utilize the grievance machinery before bringing a law suit against
his employer for breach of the contract.8 A typical grievance
procedure consists of three to five steps." First, the employee or his
union representative presents the grievance to the company's
department foreman and division superintendent. The grievance
committees of the union and employer then meet. Unless the
grievance is "washed out" or remedied at one of these early stages,
it is pressed through the remaining steps specified in the collective
bargaining agreement, the final stage of which generally provides
either for impartial arbitration of the grievance or for serving a
strike notice on the employer. It has been reported that in collective
bargaining agreements which cover one thousand or more
employees, 94 percent of grievance procedures now provide forarbitration as the final step.10 Despite this statistic, open-end
grievance procedure remains very important in smaller-scale labor
' Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). See notes 34-37 infra and
accompanying text. While the collective bargaining agreement in Maddox provided for
arbitration as the final step of the grievance procedure, the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the
Maddox holding as binding an employee to the contractual remedies even when they do not
include arbitration. See Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 417 (5th
Cir. 1966); notes 59-64 infra and accompanying text.
'In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). the collective bargaining agreement created a fivestep grievance procedure, with the fifth step being the referral of the grievance to a specified
arbitrator. Id. at 175 n.3. The contract involved in Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry
Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966), provided for a grievance procedure whose fifth and final
step required a letter from the union to the plant manager to the effect that the union
intended to strike in protest of the plant manager's denial of the grievance in the fourth step.
Id. at 415-16. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), interpreted a grievance
procedure having four steps, the last of which was a provision for arbitration. Id. at 660-62
n.2. See generally. Rosen, The Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another
Look at the Problen,. 24 MO. L. REV. 233, 244-51 (1964).
" U.S. BURFAU Oi- LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T oF LABOR. BULL. No. 1425-6, MAJOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION PRO :I)UREiS 4-5 (1966) (statistics do
not include railroad, airline and government-employee collective bargaining agreements): see
A. Cox & ). BoK. CASIS AND MATILRIAI.S ON LABOR LAW 516 (6th ed. 1965): Jay,
Irhitration and the IFederal Commton Law ol Collective Bargaining .Agreements. 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 448. 452. n.18 (1962).
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contracts, and a few sources indicate that it may be of increasing
importance even in large scale agreements."
As an adjunct of the grievance machinery provisions, the
collective bargaining agreement may include a final determination
clause making any settlement between the union and the employer
at any stage of the grievance proceedings binding upon the
aggrieved employee, the union; and the employer." If such a clause
is conclusive of the employee's rights, it may deprive him of an
opportunity to receive an impartial determination of the merits of
his grievance, particularly if the union's interests could be adversely
affected by processing the grievance completely through the
grievance machinery.'3 This potential unfairness to the employee,
the probability of which is increased when the open-end grievance
procedure is utilized, lies at the root of the conflict over the
employee's right to sue under section 301(a).
SECTION

203(d)

OF THE

LMRA

Federal encouragement of the grievance-procedure method of
settling employee disputes arising under a labor contract is
manifested clearly by the deference paid to it by both Congress and
the Supreme Court. Congressional preference for the collective
bargaining solution to employee grievances is palpably expressed in
section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective bargaining agreement. 4
"A recent report indicates that "there appears to have been a leveling-off in the number of
new cases [of grievance arbitration]. The American Arbitration Association says its 1966
caseload fell from 1965, the second such year-to-year decline in the past four years. A
number of companies say they have begun to rely less on arbitration, and a few have
abandoned it almost completely." Green, Settling Dijferencts, Wall Street Journal. July 13,
1967, at I, col. 6; see Repas, Grievance Procedures Without Arbitration, 20 IND. & LAD.
REL. Rev. 381 (1967).
'"See, e.g.. Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir.
1966). The collective bargaining agreement involved in Rothlein v. Armour & Co., 391 F.2d
574 (3d Cir. 1968), contained a typical final determination clause which stated that "when a
settlement is arrived at, at any stage of this [grievance] procedure, such decision shall be
final and binding on all parties." Id. at 577 n.7. See generally Comment, Section 301(a) and
the Employee: An Illusory Remedy, 35 FORD. L. Rev. 517, 518-28 (1967).
*See notes 78-82 infra and accompanying text.
"29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
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The Supreme Court has -liberally interpreted section 203(d) as
requiring that the means of grievance settlement provided in the
collective bargaining agreement be given "full play" by the courts."
Without further explaining the import of the term "full play," the
courts continually have sought to effectuate the policy of section
203(d)" by limiting the remedies of the individual employee to
those agreed upon.
SECTION

301(a)

AND FEDERAL LABOR LAW

The section 203(d) policy approving private-dispute settlement
procedures is especially germane to an analysis of LMRA section
301(a)," which provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce . . . , or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
Section 301(a) does not specifically authorize the federal courts to
entertain suits alleging employee grievances; nor does it specify who
can institute actions under it. These questions were left for the
courts to resolve in the hope that rules of decision consistent with
the policy of the national labor laws would develop. 9
Looking only at the principal purpose behind section 301(a)-to
provide a suitable forum in which labor agreements could be
"United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
16E.g.. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960); Dallas Typographical Union, Local 173 v. A.H. Belo Corp., 372 F.2d
577 (5th Cir. 1967); United Furniture Workers v. Fort Smith Couch & Bedding Co., 214 F.
Supp. 164 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
"See General Drivers, Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963) (per curiam), in which
the Court held that a district court had jurisdiction under section 301(a) to enforce an award
rendered through the employment of grievance machinery established by the collective
bargaining agreement, even though the award may not have been a product of arbitration.
1129 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
'"Section 30 1(a) does not divest the state courts of jurisdiction in actions brought
thereunder. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). Nevertheless, the state
courts must follow and apply federal law in all section 301(a) suits. Local 174, Teamsters
Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957). But see UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) (state
statute of limitations applied in a section 301 action).
"'SENATE CONINI. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, THE PROPOSED

FEDERAL LABOR

RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1947).
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it is difficult to see how this statute could collide with

the closely related policy of section 203(d). Indeed, in the first
major judicial construction of section 301(a), Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,2' the Supreme Court ordered an employer
to abide by his promise to arbitrate employee grievances and thus
effectuated enforcement of the section 203(d) policy of encouraging
private-settlement processes. The potential for conflict between the operative effects of
section 301(a) and the policy of section 203(d) resulted from the
Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Evening News Association.

By allowing an individual employee to sue his employer for breach
of the collective bargaining agreement, 4 Evening News raised the
2-353 U.S. 448 (1957), noted in 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1123 (1957), 43 CORNELL L.Q. 503

(1958) and I I V'AND. L. REV. 243 (1957); see Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and
the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Bunn, Lincoln
Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreentents. 43 \,A. L. REV.
1247 (1957); Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor. Agreentents-A New Era in Collective
Bargaining,43 'VA. L. REV. 1261 (1957).
" The employers in Lincoln Mills had refused to submit an employee grievance to
arbitration, which was established by the contract as the ultimate means of settling disputes.
353 U.S. at 449. Asserting that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act demonstrated
that Congress sought to make collective bargaining agreements equally binding upon and
enforceable against all parties to them, the Lincoln Mills Court held that section 301
authorized federal district courts to compel specific performance of the employer's promise
to arbitrate. 353 U.S. at 456. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Douglas prefaced his
discussion of the legislative history by noting: "The legislative history of § 301 is somewhat
cloudy and confusing. But there are a few shafts of light that illuminate our problem." Id. at
452; see Feinsinger, supra note 21, at 1267-72. For the legislative history of section 301. see
the appendix to Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills. 353 U.S. at 485.
2 371 U.S. 195 (1962), noted in 4 B.C. IND. & Co.i. L. REV. 766 (1963). I1 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 438 (1964) and 16 VAND. L. REv. 1252 (1963).
- Another important holding of the Supreme Court in Evening News was that even though
the facts alleged arguably constituted an unfair labor practice, state court jurisdiction was
not preempted. 371 U.S. at 197-201. The Court noted that, "[alecording to this view [of
respondent company], suits by employees for breach of a collective bargaining contract
would not arise under § 301 and would be governed by state law, if not preempted by
Garmon [San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon. 359 U.S. 236 (1959)], as this one
would be, whereas a suit by a union for the same breach of the same contract would be
a § 301 suit ruled by federal law. Neither the language and structure of § 301 nor its
legislative history requires or persuasively supports this restrictive interpretation, which
would frustrate rather than serve the congressional policy expressed in that section." Id. at
200.
The Court earlier had ruled in Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney. 368 U.S. 502 (1962), that
'§ 301(a) simply gives the federal district courts jurisdiction over suits for violation of
certain specified types of contracts. The statute does not state nor even suggest that such
jurisdiction shall be exclusive." Id. at 506; see Feldesman, Section 301 and the National
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possibility that employees would ignore the grievance machinery
altogether and go directly to the courts to settle their claims. While
the correlative right to sue their union for breach of the duty of fair
representation provided employees with protection from union
abuses of the grievance machinery,25 the possibility remained that a

grievant might undermine the collective settlement processes by
refusing to allow his union a reasonable chance to settle his case.

As a practical matter, if employee grievances were sure to get a
thorough second look in the courts, the private-settlement
mechanisms would be much less important, and might atrophy

entirely.
Apparently realizing that full expansion of the individual's right

to sue his employer or bargaining representative would subvert the
congressional policy of section 203(d), the Supreme Court
undertook to accommodate sections 301(a) and 203(d) in Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox.2 6 In an opinion that stressed the federal
policy of fostering private settlement of labor disputes,27 the Court
dismissed the complaint of an employee because he brought the
court action without first seeking redress through the available

grievance machinery." The holding in Maddox promulgated a
Labor Relations Act. 30 TENN. L. REV. 16 (1962); Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary
Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1963).
11Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), noted in 5 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 848
(1964), 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1238 (1965) and 17 VAND. L. REV. 1328 (1964). The employee's
individual right to sue under section 301(a) was enlarged in Humphrey v. Moore which held
that in some circumstances an employee may sue his bargaining representative under section
301(a) by alleging that the union breached the contract by violating its duty of fair
representation. The Court stated: "Although there are differing views on whether a violation
of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice . . . , it is not necessary for us
to resolve that difference here. Even if it is, or arguably may be an unfair labor practice, the
complaint here alleged that Moore's discharge would violate the contract and was therefore
within the cognizance of federal . . . courts.
... 375 U.S. at 344. In concurring, Mr.
Justice Goldberg disagreed with the majority's rationale, contending that "such a claim of
breach of the union's duty of fair representation cannot properly be treated as a claim of
breach of the collective bargaining contract supporting an action under § 301(a)." Id. at
355.
"' 379 U.S. 650 (1965), noted in 25 LA. L. REV. 949 (1965); see Zile, The Componential
Structure of Labor-Management ContractualRelationships:Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox
and Humphrey v. Moore. 43 U. D-r. L.J. 321 (1966).
379 U.S. at 653.
By concluding that "unless the contract provides otherwise, there can be no doubt that
the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf," id. at 653, the
majority in Maddox provoked a vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Black. He asserted: "I
cannot and do not believe any law Congress has passed provides that when a man ,becomes a
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general rule that employees had to attempt to exhaust the grievance
machinery established in the collective bargaining agreement before
going to court. 9
The Supreme Court's latest effort to construe section 301(a),
Vaca v. Sipes, represents an extension of previously enunciated
principles. The union in Vaca refused to submit the employee's
grievance to arbitration, which was the fifth and final step in the
grievance procedure. The grievant sued his union, alleging in his
301(a) action a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.
The Court reversed the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court
because, in determining that the union had not breached its duty,
that court failed to apply the proper standard, which is whether the
"union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit
is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."'" By reviewing the
facts of the state court decision, the court reaffirmed that state
court jurisdiction over a breach of contract action is not preempted
by the National Labor Relations Act, even though the facts alleged
constitute a union unfair labor practice. 2
member of a labor union in this country he thereby has somehow surrendered his own
freedom and liberty to conduct his own lawsuit for wages." Id. at 670. Several
commentators support the position of Mr. Justice Black. See, e.g., Blumrosen, WorkerUnion Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1435 (1963); Summers, Individual Rights In
Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362 (1962); Tuttle, Federal
Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964): Wolk,
The Decline of Individual Rights, 16 LAB. L.J. 266 (1965). But see notes 108-10 infra and
authorities cited therein.
"The narrow holding emphasized that "individual employees wishing to assert contract
grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer
and union as the mode of redress." 379 U.S. at 652 (emphasis by the Court). However, in
dictum the Maddox Court stressed that "if the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily
presses the individual's claim, differences may arise as to the forms of redress then
available." Id. 379 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added).
- 386 U.S. 171 (1967), noted in 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1351 (1967), 13 WAYNE L. REV. 602
(1967) and 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968).
" 386 U.S. at 190; see id. at 189-98.
32The narrow holding was that the jurisdiction of the courts is not preempted in this
instance by the N LR B's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices merely because the
employee in his section 301 action alleges that the union breached its statutory duty of fair
representation, which the Board considers to be an unfair labor practice. Id. at 177-88. This
holding represents an exception to the broad preemption doctrine promulgated by the Court
in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In addition to this
holding, the Vaca Court presented several reasons for permitting state courts to exercise
jurisdiction over such cases rather than placing exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB. First, the
need for avoiding possible conflicts in the substantive law, which justifies giving one body
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More important for its analysis of the interaction of sections
301(a) and 203(d) is the strong dictum in Vaca which sets forth the
prerequisites to section 301(a) relief by an aggrieved employee. The
discussion in Vaca is perhaps best understood as an extension of
the exhaustion of remedies rule established in Republic Steel Corp.
v. Maddox.3 Whereas Maddox required an employee to attempt to
exhaust the grievance machinery before suing under section 301(a),
the Vaca Court apparently holds that an excusable failure to
exhaust contractual remedies must be traceable to an unlawful act
by the employee's union. Thus where an employee's claim has not
in fact been processed through all steps of the grievance procedure,
the employer's motion for summary judgment will be granted
unless the employee can show a breach of the duty of fair
representation by his union." This result narrows the accessability
of section 301(a) relief, and thus enhances the role of privatesettlement procedures as advocated by the policy behind section
203(d). 5 The exhaustion rule reflects the effort of the Court to
balance the congressional policy of section 203(d) against the
judicial protection afforded employees by section 301(a). However,
within this framework, the Supreme Court has not yet determined
whether there is or should be a distinction between procedures with
an arbitration provision and open-end procedures having no
arbitration clause. Nor has the Court explicitly resolved the issue of
the effect to be accorded a final determination clause when asserted
by either the employer or the union in defending against an
employee's section 301 (a) action.
exclusive jurisdiction, was not present because the Board itself, in disposing of unfair
representation allegations, employs doctrines developed and applied by the courts. 386 U.S.
at 180-81. Moreover, such suits entail the assessment of substantive policies and postures
assumed in bargaining negotiations, a task which courts can perform as satisfactorily as the
Board. 386 U.S. at 181. Furthermore, the NLRB's General Counsel, exercising his
unreviewable discretion, often will refuse to file complaints with the Board against unions on
behalf of individual employees, thereby limiting the availability of Board consideration of the
grievance. Id. at 182 n.8.
"See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
" The court's dictum stated that "the wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action
against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual
remedies, provided that the employee can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached
its duty of fair representation. . . . [T]he jurisdiction of the courts is no more destroyed by
the fact that the employee, as part and parcel of his § 301 action, finds it necessary to prove
an unfair labor practice by the union, than it is by the fact that the suit may involve an
unfair labor practice by the employer himself." 386 U.S. at 186.
" See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
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A final determination clause purports to bind the grievant,
union, and employer to the settlement reached through the
grievance procedure set up by the collective bargaining agreement.'"
Inclusion of such clauses in labor contracts probably reflects a
conscious desire of both the union and the employer to restrict the
remedies available to grievants in the bargaining unit. The Supreme
Court in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox "' recognized the
legitimacy of labor-management interests in delimiting the available
remedies .3 Thus, employers do not want to handle or defend
against groundless claims which can be eliminated by the operation
of final determination clauses in collective agreements." Union
interests are also served since the processing of employee grievances
"complements the union's status as the exclusive bargaining
representative by permitting it to participate in the continuing
administration of the contract" 40 and enhances the union's prestige
when it conscientiously and successfully administers grievance
claims.4 Furthermore, both labor and management have an interest
in finalizing the grievance procedure to avoid the uncertainty
created by inconsistent judicial interpretations of the collective
agreement.42 In addition to these private interests, congressional
support for enforcing final determination clauses is implicit in
section 203(d) of the Taft-Harley Act,43 which expresses a desire
that the method agreed upon by the parties to collective bargaining
agreements be the ultimate means of settling grievances.
Despite a paucity of judicial decisions in which claims have
been denied because of the presence of final determination clauses,
one may conclude that the courts will not give effect to such a
clause unless the parties to the contract clearly provide that the
resolution reached by use of the grievance machinery is to be final

" See note

12 supra and accompanying text.
"379 U.S. 650 (1965). See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
"379 U.S. at 653.
"See Zile, supra note 26, at 340-41.
379 U.S. at 653.
' ld.
Id. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
-'29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964); see notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
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and binding.4 Perhaps the most edifying judicial expression of this
conviction is found in a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, which asserted: "In order for a contractual remedy to be
considered as final and binding, it is our view that the intent of
finality must be spelled out therein or at least be contextually
implicit from a reading of the agreement."4 However, even if the
final determination clause is clear, it remains uncertain what actual
effect such a clause has on an employee's opportunity to prevail in
a section 301(a) action. An examination of cases involving both
closed- and open-end grievance procedures is necessary to isolate
the determinative factors.
Grievance Procedures With An Arbitration Clause
It is difficult to ascertain the independent effect of a final
determination clause in a grievance procedure containing an
arbitration clause, for the courts rarely rely on a final
determination clause as the sole basis of a decision. Instead, where
an arbitration provision is incorporated in the collective bargaining
agreement, the courts generally dismiss employees' section 301(a)
actions on the ground that federal labor policy favors voluntary
arbitration as the means of resolving labor disputes.4 6 To promote
that policy, the courts refuse to entertain section 301(a) actions
filed before completion of the arbitration. Similarly, if the
"See, e.g.. Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir.
1966); Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1961); Guille v. Mushroom
Transp. Co.. 425 Pa. 607, 608, 229 A.2d 903, 904-05 (1967).
" Aughenbaugh v. North Am. Refractories Co., 426 Pa. 211, 217, 231 A.2d 173, 177
(1967).
" See. e.g.. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Drake Bakeries,
Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
'See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 170, 184 (1966); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650, 657-58 (1965); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 196 n.] (1962).
If the union decides that the employee's grievance lacks merit, it likely will not prosecute
the grievance through arbitration. If the collective bargaining agreement contains a final
determination clause, the employee thus will not receive an impartial consideration of the
merits of his grievance unless he can demonstrate that his bargaining representative has
breached its duty of fair representation. See. e.g.. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964);
notes 113-26 infra and accompanying text. Moreover, if the union voluntarily withdraws the
grievance during arbitration itself, an employee may be precluded from succeeding in a
section 301(a) action against his employer. Campbell v. Mardigian Corp., 253 F. Supp. 110
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employee's claim is grounded on an allegation of the arbitrator's

error or unfairness, the refusal to review will be based on a desire
to give finality to the arbitration award.48 Moreover, by strictly

limiting judicial review of arbitration awards, the courts are
respecting the expectations of the parties to the labor contract, who
by an expert impartial arbitrator
feel that the resolution of disputes
49
alternatives.
other
to
is superior
Congressional support for the policy of promoting labor-

grievance arbitration may be 'found in the legislative history of
section 203(d), which gives primary emphasis to settlements reached
through the collective bargaining process. 0 The Supreme Court

likewise has displayed a deference for arbitration by holding that
the arbitrators, not the courts, are to determine whether the

procedural prerequisites to arbitration have been satisfied.'

The

(E.D. Mich. 1966). In both cases, the mere presence of an arbitration provision provides no
protection. Indeed these situations are highly similar to that encountered under the open-end
procedures, and the same rationale which supports denial of judicial relief where such
procedure contains a final determination clause also applies here. See notes 91-98 infra and
accompanying text.
43E.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Miller
v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 366 F.2d 92 (Ist Cir. 1966); Panza v. Armco Steel Corp., 316
F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 897 (1964). In Enterprise Wheel, the Court
stated that ". .. the question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a
question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for. and
so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."
363 U.S. at 599; see Aaron, JudicialIntervention in LaborArbitration. 20 STAN. L. REV. 41
(1967).
"See A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 516-20 (6th ed. 1965);
cf Note, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards after the Trilogy. 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 136, 150 (1967); "The fact that collective bargaining agreements almost always contain
provisions' for arbitration indicates that parties rarely consider not including it. The real
reason for an arbitration agreement is practical necessity, not implicit faith in the
arbitrator's wisdom."
50S. MiNt. REP. No. 105, Pr. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1947) stated: "Section 203(d)
directs the Federal Mediation Service in grievance disputes to emphasize to the parties their
obligation to provide in their collective bargaining agreements for the final adjustments of
grievances by submitting such disputes to an umpire or adjustment board. We thoroughly
concur in the desirability of the inclusion in agreements of arbitration as the final step in the
adjustment of grievances."
11John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555-59 (1964), noted in 6 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. REv. 344 (1965), 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 224 (1965) and 73 YALE L.J. 1459
(1964). In Wiley, the Court chose to leave the question of procedural arbitrability with the
arbitrator because it felt that it often would be impossible to determine the procedural issues
without examining the substantive questions. The Court also noted that the time expended in
getting judicial determinations of procedural issues would vitiate the federal labor policy
favoring the rapid resolution of labor-management disputes. 376 U.S. at 556-58.
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NLRB has evidenced a similar attitude. 2 Both the courts and the
NLRB have applied the policy favoring arbitration to bar section
301(a) actions against unions,53 employers, 4 and arbitrators."
Given the strong federal support of arbitration and the probable
fairness of decisions achieved through a procedure containing an
arbitration clause, it is not surprising that courts refuse to review
arbitration awards, whether or not there is a final determination
clause in the collective bargaining agreement. Even in the absence
of an explicit final determination clause, inclusion of an arbitration
provision seems to imply that the parties have agreed to a final,
binding procedure.16 Only if the labor contract contains a specific
provision for appellate review of the award17 will this inference be
refuted. Thus, in litigation involving contracts with arbitration
clauses, the presence or absence of a final determination clause will
not be crucial unless there is also a specific provision for judicial
review of arbitration awards. In this situation the court will be
forced to resolve the apparent inconsistency between final
determination and judicial review by attempting to discern the
intent of the parties in including both provisions. 8
"Since its decision in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), the Board has
honored all arbitration awards meeting its tests of fairness and regularity. In Raytheon
Company, 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), however, the Board restricted its acceptance to those
awards in which the arbitrator had determined the same issue as the one before the Board.
" E.g.. Balowski v. UAW, 372 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1967).
'"E.g., Miller v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 366 F.2d 92 (lst Cir. 1966); Clover v.
Columbus Retail Merchants Delivery, Inc., 115 Ohio App. 467, 185 N.E.2d 658 (1962).
" E.g., Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
"See, e.g., Transport Workers, Local 234 v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 228 F. Supp. 423
(E.D. Pa. 1964); Guille v. Mushroom Transp. Co., 425 Pa. 607, 229 A.2d 903 (1967). The
court in Philadelphia Transp. Co., supra at 425, asserted: "There is no provision for
appellate review of an arbitration award contained in the collective bargaining agreement
between the Union and the P.T.C. Therefore, the Award in issue must be considered a final
award."
"See 2 BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING -NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 51, 301-02
(1966); Smith & Jones, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance Arbitration
on Judges, Arbitrators, and Parties, 52 VA. L. REv. 831, 897-908 (1966).
Under certain contracts, disputed issues of arbitrability are to be resolved by the courts.
l-or example, a recently-expired collective agreement between the Meter-All Manufacturing
Company and the I U E, expressly made arbitration decisions subject to judicial review.
",The presence of both a final determination clause and a provision for judicial review of
the arbitration decision might be rationalized by viewing the former as a requirement that
the parties adhere to the procedures of the agreement and the latter as the final step in those
procedures. The parties would be compelled to carry disputes through the arbitration
process, and on review of the arbitration decision could only raise the limited issues of fraud
or capriciousness by the arbitrators and arbitrability rather than having available a broader
spectrum of attack.
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Open-end Grievance Procedures

Few courts have been compelled to determine the impact of a
final determination clause where the grievance procedures are open-

ended, that is, not culminating in arbitration. Nevertheless, in the
cases which have arisen, the presence or absence of a final

determination clause seems to have -made a substantial difference in
the outcome of section 301(a) actions. The leading case on this
issue is Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 9 in which the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized a final
determination clause as a bar to a section 301(a) suit by an
employee whose grievance had been prosecuted without resolution
through an open-end grievance procedure. The final step of the

grievance procedure, which would have required a letter from the
international union to the plant manager announcing the union's

intention to strike in protest of the plant manager's denial of the
employee's claim, was not taken. 0 Nevertheless, assuming that the
employee had exhausted the contractual remedies," the court held

that under the terms of the contract's final determination clause 2
the employee's claim was finalized, and therefore judicially barred,

by the union's failure to strike.63 To support its enforcement of the
final determination clause as a defense to the employee's section
301(a) action, the Haynes court relied upon the Supreme Court's
policy of giving full play to whatever means the parties to the
19362

F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966), noted in 35 GEo. VASH. L. REV 590 (1967).
"See 362 F.2d at 415-16.
6 The court noted: "We may assume arguendo that appellant [employee] has exhausted his
contractual remedy. His claim was carried to the point where it would have been necessary
for his union to notify the employer of its intention to strike in support of his claim. At this
point, the decision denying him relief was 'final' under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement." Id. at 417. See note 62 infra.
62 The collective bargaining agreement contained a final determination clause which
provided: "Any settlement between the Company and the Union at any step of the above
grievance procedure, shall be binding on the Company and the Union and the aggrieved." Id.
at 416.
" "The fact of the matter here is that the union processed appellant's grievance up to the
point of striking. The denial of his claim then became final. We believe the law to be that his
claim was thereby barred. .... The action under the terms of the agreement, may be asserted
in bar as an affirmative defense." Id. at 418. The court commented that there was no claim
of unfair representation, implying that the employee's claim may not have been barred had
there been an allegation of the union's breach of its duty of fair representation in handling
the grievance. This would be consistent with the views of other courts on this point. See
notes 119-26 infra and cases cited therein.
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collective bargaining agreement have chosen for settling
grievances. 64 Thus, since the final determination clause constituted
an integral element of the grievance procedure, it was immaterial

that the agreement had no arbitration provision.65

In contrast to Haynes, the collective bargaining agreement
under scrutiny in International Brotherhood of Telephone Workers
v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co.16 prescribed an open-

end grievance procedure without any final determination clause.
The district court in New England Telphone first determined that it

had jurisdiction under section 301(a) and that both the union and
67
employee had standing to bring the action against the employer,
and then the court considered the merits of an employee claim

which had been processed through all steps of the open-end
grievance procedure. 6 Although no rationale was spelled out to

justify the court's inquiry into the merits of the complaint, it was
implicit in the court's action that the federal policy of section
203(d) was not powerful enough, in the absence of an explicit final
determination clause, to override the rights conferred under section
301 (a).

Consistent with New England Telphone is the decision of the
Court of Appeals of Michigan in Alarcon v. Fabricon Products,
Division of Eagle-Picher Co.69 Alarcon involved a section 301(a)
suit of a discharged employee whose grievance had been proSee notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
6

362 F.2d at 417.

240 F. Supp. 426 (D. Mass. 1965).
Id. at 428-29. In so ruling, the court relied upon Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S.
195 (1962). See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
In American Motors Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 32 Wis. 2d 237, 145
N.W.2d 137 (1966), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that where the employer and the
union had exhausted the contract's open-end grievance procedure, the union could sue to
enforce the collective bargaining agreement against the employer by means of the unfair
labor practice procedure of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. The court made no
mention of a final determination clause. If no such clause was present, the decision is
consistent with the theory of the Telephone Workers case. However, if the collective
agreement contained such a clause, the court's decision contravenes the federal labor policy
by permitting the union to avoid the effect of the final determination clause representing the
parties' chosen method of resolving their differences.
" The court took notice of the fact that the union processed the employee's grievance
"through the grievance procedure contained in the collective bargaining agreement without
satisfactorily resolving the dispute. The collective bargaining agreement contains no provision
for arbitration of unresolved grievances." 240 F. Supp. at 428.
65 Mich. App. 25, 145 N.W.2d 816 (1966).
67
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cessed through an open-end grievance procedure. After the trial
court had granted the employer's motion for summary judgment
because the union had agreed to drop the plaintiff's grievance, 0 the
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a
decision on the merits of the employee's claim, holding that where
the collective bargaining agreement "fails to provide a method of
resolving . . . grievances, any intent of the parties to deny the
grieved employee recourse to the courts after exhausting the
grievance procedures, must be clearly spelled out."' Since no type
of final determination clause seems to have been present in
Alarcon, the decision gives no indication of whether a final
determination clause similar to that in Haynes" would be
considered sufficiently explicit to deny employees the right to
institute a section 301(a) action after exhausting grievance
procedure."
Two recent decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit suggest a different rationale which casts some doubt on
whether, as a general rule, the courts will give conclusive effect to
final determination clauses where the collective bargaining
agreement fails to provide for impartial arbitration. In Rothlein v.
Armour & Co., 74 the district court which had dismissed an
70

ld. at
, 145 N.W.2d at 818.
Id. at 145 N.W.2d at 821. The court reasoned that the "plaintiff's legal action,
brought after termination of the grievance process, could not further burden the grievance
machinery. Whether or not the union could 'wash out' plaintiff's grievance while it was still
only a grievance being processed under the contract, when plaintiff's grievance ripened into a
cause of action which he could enforce in the courts, the union had no authority under the
contract to destroy the cause of action by agreeing with the company to withdraw the
plaintiff's claim." Id. at 145 N.W.2d at 821 (footnotes omitted).
2 See note 62 supra.
" See note 60 supra and

accompanying text. The union in Alarcon had voted to strike over
all pending grievances, including that of Alarcon, before the settlement between the union
and the employer was negotiated, and apparently only the accord prevented the union from
striking on behalf of Alarcon and the other grievants. 5 Mich. App. at ,
145 N.W.2d at
818. This is probably the clearest basis upon which Alarcon may be distinguished from
Haynes. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text.
Apparently, the Alarcon court considered the employee's cause of action against his
employer to be perfected when the union initially decided to strike on his behalf, see id. at
145 N.W.2d at 818, a decision which created a cause of action that could not be
destroyed by any subsequent union action and which excused the employee from' having to
await the vindication of his contractual rights through the pressure exerted on the employer
by the strike.
'4 391

F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1968).
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employee's section 30 1(a) action on the rationale of Haynes was

reversed on a procedural holding.- The Third Circuit went further,
however, and in strong dictum discussed the factors which it would
consider important in deciding whether to accept a private

determination of the merits as a basis for granting summary
judgment against an employee.76 The Third Circuit's approach

proposed a particularized inquiry designed in each case to satisfy
the court that the dispute was of the type contemplated by the
grievance procedures of the contract" and that, despite a

coincidence of union and management interests adverse to the
interests of the employee,' the grievance machinery was likely to be

impartial.
The Third Circuit had an opportunity to apply its Rothlein
rationale in Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co.79 The
plaintiff employees in Bieski brought their section 301(a) suit
against the employer who had purchased the assets of their former
employer's business but had refused to hire them or to allow them
'The employee's section 301 suit in Rothlein demanded an accounting and payment
allegedly owed under a pension plan set up by a prior collective bargaining agreement. The
grievance was pursued unsuccessfully by the employees through the contractual procedures
prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement which was in force when the complaint
arose. The employer's motion for summary judgment on the basis of this private merit
determination was granted by the district court, citing Haynes. 268 F. Supp. at 545. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed because a substantial issue of fact remained
as to which collective bargaining agreement governed the grievance procedure. This issue was
crucial since the prior collective bargaining agreement was also open-end, but contained no
final determination clause. 391 F.2d at 576-78.
"See 391 F.2d at 578-80.
"*In Rothlein the court was concerned with whether an action for an "accounting" was the
type of "difference" contemplated by the contract. 391 F.2d at 580. More generally, the
court's analysis appears to question whether the subject matter of a particular grievance has
been delegated to the grievance procedure by the terms of the contract. Stated in this fashion,
the suggested inquiry clearly presages one of the jurisdictional issues in Bieski v. Eastern
Auto. I-orwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968). See notes 84 & 85 infra and
accompanying text.
' Both the employer and the union had a potential economic interest in seeing the
employee's claim defeated. The union had secured the employer's promise to contribute
directly to its pension fund, rather than maintaining its own separate plan for the employees.
This plan might have been jeopardized if the employees were held to have "vested" rights in
the prior pension fund. The employer's total liability for pension payments would also
probably increase if the grievance was resolved in favor of the employees. The court seemed
to consider this situation as creating an intolerable potential for unfairness to the employees.
See 391 I-.2d at 580 n.27.
"396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968).
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to retain their seniority rights as required by the governing multiemployer collective bargaining agreement. The agreement contained
a provision for arbitration as well as a final determination clause, 0
but since the employees' grievance was washed out before an
arbitral hearing, the policy preference for arbitration was not a
factor in the case.' Pursuing the detailed inquiry espoused by
Rothlein, the court found that although the union involved had not
breached its duty of fair representation, neither had it provided
effective advocacy of the grievants' interests. 2 In Bieski the unity of
union and management interests, which the Rothlein court cited as
one reason for disregarding a private-merits determination, was
present and strongly influenced the decision to reverse the summary
judgment against the employees. 3 By a somewhat strained
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the Bieski
court also determined that the Joint Committee's decision to wash
out the grievance was "jurisdictional" in the sense that it concerned
whether the Committee had the power under the collective
bargaining agreement to process the dispute." At this point an
analogy was drawn to the issue of whether or not a particular
dispute should go to arbitration, and the court thus justified its
inquiry into the merits of the private determination by citing
arbitration cases which approved a stricter standard of judicial
review."S Although Bieski can be explained on this latter rationale

alone, the court's inquiry into the adequacy of the private-grievance
machinery was clearly a fundamental part of its analysis. This
appears to be the first time a court has approached the question of
whether it should give conclusive effect to a private-merits

Id. at 34.
,Id. at 36. See note 47 supra.
82 Bieski. like Rothlein, presented a fact situation in which arguably the union as well as
the employer had an interest in seeing the employees' grievance discharged. See note 78
supra. The Bieski union represented the employees of the purchasing and the selling
employers. The employees of the purchaser-employer did not want to be pushed down the
seniority list by "dovetailing" in the employees of the seller-employer. In the grievance
committee the union took a "neutral" position, leaving the committee under the control of
the management representatives whose fringe benefit costs were tied to the seniority of his
employees. Predictably, the employee grievance was unanimously defeated. 396 F.2d at 36.
" See id. at 39-40.
" Id. at 37-38.
"1Id. at 38.
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determination by (1) assessing the weight of the employee's claim,
(2) measuring the potential for unfairness in the applicable
grievance procedure and (3) balancing both (1) and (2) against the
collective union, management and employee interest in finalizing
their grievance procedure." -Since the finality of each private-merits
decision can be tested on these uncertain scales which leave so
much room for the courts to apply their own particular view of the
merits, the Rothlein-Bieski rationale could introduce much
uncertainty into the administration of collective bargaining
contracts.
While the paucity of cases construing open-end grievance
provisions limits the strength of the conclusions, perhaps some
working hypotheses can be constructed as to the effect of final
determination clauses in -this context. First, where the collective
bargaining agreement contains a final determination clause, but no
provision for arbitration, an individual employee whose claim has
been finalized will be barred from bringing a section 301(a)
action, "7 unless he can show either that his union has violated its
duty of fair representation in representing his interests, 8 or that the
adverse merits determination concerned an issue not delegated to
the grievance procedure by the collective bargaining agreement. 9
However, if the Rothlein-Bieski rationale is followed, another
exception will have to be recognized whenever "the adequacy of the
proceedings . . . [are] not commensurate with the importance of
the . . . question presented." 0 Second, exhaustion of an open-end
grievance procedure will not bar the employee's suit where the
section 203(d) policy is not invoked by a clearly expressed final
determination clause. 9' In contrast with the open-end grievance
"This balancing rationale is tied into the controversy over the various theories of -the
union-management relationship. See notes 99-112 infra and accompanying text.
"See Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966). See
notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text.
"See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967): Rothlein v. Armour & Co., 391 F.2d 574, 579
(3d Cir. 1968) (dictum).
' Rothlein v. Armour & Co., 391 F.2d 574, 577, 579-80 (3d Cir. 1968).
" Bieski v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32, 41 (3d Cir. 1968). The Bieski test
could be viewed as watering down the Vaca requirement of unfair representation to one of
"effective" representation, with the weight of the employee's claim and possible conflicts of
interest between the grievant and either his union or other union members as factors in the
standard of adequacy.
" See International Bhd. of Tel. Workers v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co.. 240 F. Supp.
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procedure, a section 301(a) suit is generally barred unless the
contract specifically provides that the decision of the arbitrator is
92
subject to judicial review.
By-granting identical effect to the final determination clause

and the arbitration clause on the theory that this is required to give
"full play" to section 203(d), the courts perhaps have overlooked
several differences between the two. On the one hand, if a contract

contains an arbitration clause, either alone or in conjunction with a
final determination provision, the individual employee's interest in
an impartial determination of the merits of his grievance" and the
union-management interest in the finality of the settlement achieved
under the grievance procedure are served.94 Therefore, when
impartial arbitration is provided for, it seems fair to bar an

employee's section 301(a) action. On the other hand, if the
employee's grievance is discharged without an arbitral hearing, not
only is the federal labor policy favoring arbitration absent, but also
there may be no fully impartial consideration of the merits of the
employee's grievance. Thus, an employee may be denied an

unbiased determination because of his race, sex, or age;9 or because
426 (D. Mass. 1965); Alarcon v. Fabricon Prods., 5 Mich. App. 25, 145 N.W.2d 816 (1966).
See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text.
9"See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
9'See notes 46.48 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 47-54 supra and accompanying text.
"See. e.g.. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mich.
108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1957); Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct.
1950). Additionally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2, -4
(1964), established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to process charges of
discrimination based on race, sex, or religion against employers and unions. In Local 12,
United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837
(1967), the Fifth Circuit held that a labor organization's breach of its duty of fair
representation constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NI.RA so as to give jurisdiction
to the NLRB. The court examined the nexus between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
NLRA and implied that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was not given
exclusive jurisdiction over claimed racial discrimination. 368 F.2d at 23-24, noted in 1967
DUKE L.J. 1037; ef Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 337-38 (S.D. Ind.
1967): "The Court finds a fundamental difference between a claim for the violation of a
collective bargaining agreement and a claim for the violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The latter is a statutory embodiment of constitutional rights that all persons are entitled to
enjoy, while the former has as its primary purpose the maintenance of industrial peace
between labor and management. It is the belief of the Court that an employee has the right
to come before the Court and assert his claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 without
regard to any contractual remedies also available to him."

Vol. 1969: III]

FINAL DETERMINATION (LAUSE

he is not a union member,. or belongs to a minority faction within
the union.96 Although an employee is shielded against invidious
discrimination by the NLRB and the courts,9 7 he may be
unprotected where the union's representation is inadequate, but
does not rise to the level of a violation of law.
Further protection for the employee under an open-end
grievance procedure may be afforded by the strike vote of the
employees, which generally is the final step in such a procedure.
The adequacy of this means of "impartial consideration" of the
merits of the grievance depends upon the willingness of union
members to strike to vindicate the rights of an aggrieved employee
in their bargaining unit. Of course, a strike-vote result may be
unrelated to the merits of the grievance if the employee is
unpopular with his fellow workers, or if the voting employees
discern that a strike would be contrary to the national labor policy
favoring labor peace,98 would be deleterious to the public image of
the union, would jeopardize the national security, or would work
substantial financial hardship upon them. Despite the possibility
that an individual's rights may be inundated by these puissant
considerations, there may nevertheless be a real nexus between the
strength of the merits of the grievance and the strike vote. Those
who vote are employees who may identify with the grievant or may
fear similar treatment by the employer in their own cases unless
they protest by voting to strike.
Therefore, on balance, it appears that an adequate measure of
fairness will be assured the grievant and the union-management
interest by according full effect to final determination clauses,
regardless of whether or not the contract provides for the
arbitration of grievances. Open-end grievance procedures do not
deprive employees of all opportunities to be heard on the merits of
their claims. They can appeal to their co-employees, and on the
basis of invidious discrimination may proceed before the NLRB or
the courts against the union for breaches of its duty of fair
representation. In the relatively few cases where union and
employer interests coincide adversely to the employee, it may be
"See, e.g., Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.
1963); Bailer v. Local 470, Teamsters, 400 Pa. 188, 161 A.2d 343 (1960).
"See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
"See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964).
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better to accept the potential for unfairness rather than to embrace
the broad exception suggested in Rothlein and Bieski. The courts,
therefore, should examine contracts to determine whether they
contain final determination clauses, in addition to ascertaining
whether there is a provision for impartial arbitration. If either is
present, the burden should be on the employee to show special
circumstances to prevent entry of summary judgment against him.
THEORIES OF THE UNION-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONSHIP

While various policies support judicial refusal to permit
employees to sue under section 301(a) after exhausting the
contractual grievance machinery, some jurists and scholars contend
that the resulting impairment of individual rights cannot be
tolerated. For instance, Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Vaca v.
Sipes," maintained that he was unable "to see how the union's
legitimate role as statutory agent is undermined by . . .allowing
the injured employee to sue his employer after he has given the
union a chance to act on his behalf."' 00 Reaffirming his dissent in
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,'0 ' Justice Black in Vaca asserted
that "an employee should be free to litigate his own lawsuit with
his own lawyer in a court before a jury, rather than being forced to
entrust his claim to a union ... ."1o, This philosophy, known as
the "individual interest predomination" theory,' 3 embraces the view
that individual employee interests cannot be protected adequately
unless each employee always has an opportunity to obtain judicial
or otherwise impartial review of the merits of his grievances against
his employer.101 It is bottomed upon the notion that the union's
- 386 U.S. 171, 203 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
"a'Id. at 209-10.
to'
379 U.S. 650, 659 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
12386 U.S. at 205 (Black, J., dissenting).
'oSIn a 1962 article, Professor Cyrus F. Smythe categorized the three basic schools of
thought concerning employee-union conflicts as individual interest predomination, group interest predomination, and joint interest determination. Smythe, Individual and Group Interests in
Collective Labor Relations, 13 LAB. L.J. 439 (1962).
" See Lenhoff, The EJYect oJ Labor Arbitration Clauses Upon the Individual. 9 ARB. J.
(n.s.) 3 (1954); Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L.
REV. 373 (1965); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y.U.L. REV. 362 (1962). Professor William P. Murphy asserted: "The fair representation
doctrine can do no more than protect the individual against the bad faith exercise of power. I
think what the individual needs and what the law should provide, at least in some instances,

is an opportunity to have his claimed right under the contract determined on its merits, even
when the union and the employer are acting in admitted good faith," Murphy, supra, at 389.
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duty of fair representation and remedies for its breach cannot
sufficiently ensure protection of the interests of individual
employees.' 5
In contrast, the Vaca majority found no problem in denying
review to grievance settlements under section 301(a) unless the
employee bringing the action could prove that his bargaining
06
representative breached its duty of fair representation.' Mr. Justice
Black, in his Vaca dissent, interpreted this view as an expression of
the "group interest predomination" theory, which he scored as
unjustifiably imposing additional barriers to suits by individual
employees against their employers.' 7 The group interest theory
embodies the notion that employees receive the best protection for
their own individual interests when these are subordinated to their
collective interest, as espoused by their elected and exclusive
bargaining representative.' °8 Underlying this conclusion is the belief
that the rights of individual employees are sufficiently safeguarded
by the fiduciary duty of fair representation, which is implemented
by granting employees standing to sue to enforce this duty."0 9 If this
theory is adopted, as it arguably has been by the Court in Vaca,
the interests of employees collectively and individually are best
served by strengthening the bargaining representative, an inevitable
consequence of the enforcement of final determination clauses."10
IO

See note 104 supra.

10,386 U.S. at 186.
0"See 386 U.S. at 205-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
"' Professor Archibald Cox maintains that "the interests of the individual will be better
protected on the whole by first according legal recognition to the group interest in the
contract administration and then strengthening the representative's awareness of its moral
and legal obligation to represent all employees fairly than by excluding the union in favor of
an individual cause of action." Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV.
601, 657 (1956).
Professor Mozart Ratner argues that "effective protection of employees against the
employer requires subordination of individual interests to the collective interest as represented
by the exclusive bargaining agent democratically selected by majority rule. To whatever
extent individual interest prevails over collective interest, inequality of bargaining power
between employer and employee necessarily survives." Ratner, Some Contemporary
Observations on Section 301, 52 GEO. L.J. 260-61 (1964).
' See Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 LAB. L.J. 850,
859 (1957).
" The limited degree of trust that the individual-interest predomination theory is willing to
credit to the union's duty of fair representation constitutes the major difference between the
two theories. Thus, while the individual-interest theory questions the efficacy of the
protection afforded to the employee by the remedies available for unfair representation, the
0
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The latest collision of the two interest predomination theories
occurred in Rothlein and Bieski, where the Third Circuit embraced
"individual interest predomination" in espousing its balancing
rationale."' These cases, of course, presented the strongest facts on
which that theory could operate, for arguably the group interest
theory was vitiated by the unity of union and management
interest." 2 To the extent that Vaca was a rejection of the individualinterest-theory analysis, the Rothlein-Bieski rationale would seem
to rest upon shaky ground, with only Mr. Justice Black as a
possible adherent on the Supreme Court.
THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

The group interest predomination theory, seemingly adopted by
the Supreme Court in Vaca, fully recognizes the effective
enforcement of the duty of fair representation as an essential
element of the theory. However, while the duty of fair
representation is implicit in section 9 of the NLRA, as amended by
the Taft-Hartley Act,"' much uncertainty remains as to how this
duty is to be enforced. Initially, an employee's complaint in an
unfair representation proceeding must satisfy certain threshold
requirements. Thus, it must present more than conclusory
statements of fact"4 and must demonstrate that the union's action
or inaction was motivated by bad faith." 5 For instance, the
employee's mere allegation that the union has assumed a position
different from his own is not sufficient."" In fact, the Michigan
group-interest theory accepts such remedies as satisfactory and implements them by making
an exception to the bar imposed by final determination clauses. See, e.g.. Williams v.
Wheeling Steel Corp., 266 F. Supp. 651 (N.D.W. Va. 1967); Meola v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,
246 Md. 226, 228 A.2d 254 (1967).
. See text accompanying notes 76-86 supra.
See notes 78 & 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
" Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964);
see Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S.
892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323

U.S. 248 (1944).
"'See, e.g., Balowski v. UAW, 372 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1967); Hardcastle v. Western
Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962); Ostrofsky
v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782, 793-94 (D. Md. 1959), ajfd. 273 F.2d 614 (4t1
Cir.), cert. denied. 363 U.S. 849 (1960).
"'See, e.g.. Gainey v. Brotherhood of Rwy. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 1963);
Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
920 (1962).
"' Brown v. Truck Drivers Local 395, 264 F. Supp. 776, 778 (D. Md. 1967), The court
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Court of Appeals requires that the complaint "state facts sufficient
to raise the presumption that there has been unfair
representation."" 7 The courts, however, have not established rules
more specific than these fundamental requirements, which
seemingly can be satisfied by a carefully drawn complaint." ' Once
the issue of union fair representation is properly presented in an
employee's section 301(a) action against his employer, the court
will inquire into the merits of the claim. Should it find no breach,
then under the group interest theory the protection of individual
interests is deemed adequate, and judicial review can justifiably be
refused if the contract contains a final determination clause. If a
breach is found the employee will be permitted review of his
contract claim against the employer.
Section 301(a) itself has been interpreted to provide statutory
authorization for judicial inquiry into, and enforcement of, the
union's duty of fair representation. Indeed, the evolution of the
employee's section 301(a) right to sue his bargaining representative
on the collective bargaining contract where there has been a breach
of the duty of fair representation" 9 has paralleled the judicial
construction of the section 301(a) right to sue the employer. Thus,
the Supreme Court in Maddox, while requiring the employee to
attempt to exhaust his contract remedies,'12 1 indicated that the
individual employee may seek redress against his union in the
courts or by means of an unfair labor practice proceeding if he is
not represented fairly.' 2 More recently, the Vaca Court held that
the jurisdiction of the courts to hear an employee's section 301(a)
allegation of unfair representation against the union is not
continued: "As pointed out in Humphrey [375 U.S. 335 (1964)], supra, the plaintiffs must
allege that the union had not made an honest effort to serve the interests of all of its
members without partiality or hostility toward any segment of its membership." Id.
"' Field v. Local 652, UAW, 6 Mich. App. 140, _ 148 N.W.2d 552, 555-56 (1967). In
the same case, the court stated: "If the employer acted in good faith and in accordance with
a union contract's procedure, he should generally be immune from employee suits. A union
agreement is assumed to be binding upon the employees and the employer is entitled to
assume the union is acting fairly with its members. rhis general rule facilitates the
continuing nature of the bargaining process. It also encourages democracy and union
responsibility." Id. at - 148 N.W.2d at 555.
"'See. e.g., Meola v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 246 Md. 226, 228 A.2d 254 (1967).
"'See notes 20-35 supra and cases cited in note 113 supra.
" See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
"If the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the individual's claim,
differences may arise as to the forms of redress then available." 379 U.S. at 652.
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preempted by the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction of unfair labor

practices.' Arguably, this holding reflects the Court's opinion that
the General Counsel for the Board will not adequately protect the
interests of individual employees.' 2 - Where a breach of the duty of

fair representation occurs, a final determination clause should not
be permitted to bar a section 301(a) suit either against a union or
an employer. 2 A primary purpose of the final determination clause
is to protect and advance the position of the bargaining
representative.'
However, when this representative breaches its

fiduciary duty of fair representation,

the major premise of

group interest predomination is eviscerated. Therefore, the
representative should not be able to avail itself of the bar intended
to strengthen its representative position when it has itself breached
its duty of representation.'2 6 Moreover, in such cases the employer
should not be permitted to invoke the final determination clause as
a bar because there has been no semblance of a true determination

of his inculpability. A union's misconduct on an employer's behalf
should clearly not be permitted to isolate the employer from his own

misdoings.
122386

U.S. 171 (1967). See note 32 supra and accompanying text.

See note 32 supra.
' , Even before Vaca. the Fifth Circuit in Haynes, 362 F.2d at 418, noted: "Appellant
[plaintiff-employee] does not contend that the union did not faithfully represent him. See
Humphrey v. Moore, supra, on the duty of the union to do so. He does not charge fraud on
the part of either the company or the union. This is a run-of-the-mine case where the
grievance procedure was followed and the adverse decision against appellant became final."
The implication is that proof of union bad faith would abrogate any employer final
determination clause defense to the employee's suit.
"I See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
'-' In Hill v. Aro Corp., 275 F. Supp. 482, 490-91 (N.D. Ohio 1967). the court upheld an
arbitration award against an employee's attack, holding that the time for moving to vacate
the award had lapsed. Nevertheless, refusing to dismiss the plaintiff-employee's complaint
against his union, the court ruled that the employee "may, if he can prove that the union was
arbitrary, discriminatory or not acting in good faith in its representation of plaintiff in the
grievance procedure and that some damages flowed from the breach, recover his damages."
Id. at 491. The Hill tribunal allowed the employer and the union to be shielded from claims
that would have required the court to ignore the arbitration award, which it recognized as
final and binding, but thereby permitted a separate cause of action to be maintained against
the union. Because the basis of the employee's action was a section 301(a) claim under
both theories, there is no practical distinction between recognizing the existence of a distinct
cause of action and merely denying the union the right to assert the arbitrator's award as a
bar, at least insofar as the union is concerned. There, however, appears to be a distinction
with respect to the employee's action against the employer because the latter, by invoking the
award as a bar, ceased to be a party defendant when the court also determined that the
employee had not alleged facts sufficient to state an independent cause of action against the
employer. Id. at 487-88.
':
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CONCLUSION

It may be generally concluded that the presence of either
arbitration provisions or final determination clauses will serve as a
bar to section 301 (a) actions in the absence of express authorization
of judicial review, or a lack of grievance procedure jurisdiction over
the issue. It is likewise apparent that under no circumstance should
a final determination clause bar a section 301(a) action where there
has been a breach of the duty of fair representation. However, a
new problem in the gray area of this scheme was created by the
adequacy-of-representation balancing rationale of Rothlein and
Bieski. Whether inadequate representation or representation tainted
with conflict of interest not reaching the level of unfair
representation should also abrogate the final determination bar is
an issue with valid considerations on either side. The interest of the
employee in effective representation must be weighed against the
employer and union interest in obtaining final determinations not
conditioned upon judicial scrutiny of so flexible and uncertain a
concept as adequacy of representation. In view of the Supreme
Court's disposition of Vaca v. Sipes and its preference for the
group interest predomination, the vitality of an adequacy-ofrepresentation test remains highly questionable and the threat it
poses to final determinations may"be short-lived.

